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Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping 
Due Process, Autonomy, and Paternalism in Balance 
Kristin Henning  
Legal disputes involving children invariably evoke a complex 
matrix of issues such as child and adolescent capacity, individual 
rights and autonomy, parental authority, and in the criminal justice 
context—diminished culpability for a minor‘s actions. While it is 
difficult to identify a clear and cohesive jurisprudence regarding the 
balance between children‘s autonomy and children‘s vulnerability 
across Supreme Court cases, a series of cases over the last decade, 
including Roper v. Simmons,
1
 Graham v. Florida,
2
 and J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina,
3
 offer a more consistent view of children as 
vulnerable, malleable, and in need of protection, at least in the 
criminal and delinquency context. In each of these cases, the Court 
solidly reaffirms the view that youth lack maturity and are more 
―susceptible to negative influences.‖4 In Graham, the focus of this 
Symposium, the Court relied on this view of adolescence to conclude 
that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole is cruel and 
unusual punishment for juveniles who are not ―as well formed‖ and 
therefore less responsible than adults for their conduct.
5
 This holding 
is undoubtedly a ―win‖ for youth and youth advocates concerned 
about the increasingly harsh legal responses to adolescent criminal 
 
  Kristin Henning, Professor of Law, Co-Director, Juvenile Justice Clinic, Georgetown 
Law. Special thanks to Lauren Dollar for invaluable research assistance and to Wallace Mlyniec 
for reading an early draft of this Essay.  
 1. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (finding that the death penalty is cruel and unusual 
punishment for juveniles).  
 2. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (finding that life without parole for non-homicide 
offenses is cruel and unusual punishment for juveniles). 
 3. 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408 (2011) (finding that age must be considered in the custody 
analysis for purposes of Miranda). 
 4. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; see also J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 
2403. 
 5. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).  
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behavior. This Essay applauds the Court‘s holding in Graham, 
however, it pauses to consider the impact of the Court‘s analysis on 
the delicate balance of due process, autonomy, and paternalism in 
resolving children‘s issues.  
Specifically, this Essay considers Graham‘s impact on the ever-
changing philosophy of the juvenile justice system, which is often at 
a crossroads between its rehabilitative, punitive, and due process 
agendas. The Supreme Court‘s affirmation in Graham of research on 
the important developmental differences between juveniles and adults 
may reinvigorate the rehabilitative goal of traditional juvenile courts 
and challenge the recent trend toward more punitive juvenile justice 
policies. However, it may also signal a shift back to a more 
paternalistic approach to children‘s law and policy, including reduced 
autonomy for youth and greater state intervention in the lives of 
children.  
Part I of this Essay begins by situating Graham within the 
historical continuum of juvenile justice practice, philosophy, and 
jurisprudence and considers how the rationale of Graham may be 
used to advance a more adolescent-appropriate response to youth at 
all stages of the juvenile justice system. By contrast, Part II reviews 
the costs associated with an unconstrained return to the rhetoric of 
rehabilitation and paternalism in juvenile courts, including the risk of 
unfettered discretion and compromised due process that were 
pervasive in the late
 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. Part 
III considers the potential impact of Graham on the individual rights 
and autonomy of youth both inside and outside of the juvenile justice 
system. Recognizing that the Court‘s holding in Graham grew partly 
out of concerns about youths‘ inability to effectively communicate 
and consult with defense counsel, Part III also considers the 
implications of developmental research on the autonomy and capacity 
of youth to exercise the right to counsel.  
Finally, in an effort to sort out the delicate balance among the 
competing interests of rehabilitative paternalism, due process, and 
individual autonomy, Part IV distinguishes between protective rights 
that are necessary to ensure accurate fact-finding and prevent undue 
coercion by the state, and capacity-based rights that are arguably only 
appropriate for youth who have sufficient capacity to exercise them. 
Part IV further recognizes that capacity is not a binary concept, but 
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instead depends significantly on the social and environmental context 
in which youth make decisions and exercise rights. Returning to the 
discussion of the role of juvenile counsel, Part IV contends that 
notwithstanding common deficiencies in the attorney-child 
relationship, loyal, client-directed defense advocacy is required in 
delinquency cases as both a protective and a capacity-based right. 
Like other due process protections, loyal defense advocacy is 
essential for accurate fact-finding in the juvenile justice system. 
Further, because capacity is a fluid concept that varies according to 
context, adult guidance, and individual ability, youth who are 
counseled in an appropriate setting, with adequate time and support 
from the lawyer, can effectively exercise the right to counsel.  
I. SITUATING GRAHAM IN THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE COURT POLICY, 
LAW, AND PRACTICE 
The key differences between juveniles and adults that were 
articulated in Graham v. Florida are not much different from those 
posited by the founders of the first juvenile court in 1899.
6
 The very 
establishment of the early juvenile court was rooted in the belief that 
children are not fully formed beings, but are instead malleable to 
treatment and rehabilitation.
7
 Although the Progressive reformers of 
the late Nineteenth Century were not privy to the developmental 
research available today, the reformers intuitively understood that 
children were physically, mentally, and morally different from adults 
and that society should respond differently to their behavior.
8
 
Reformers further believed that youth lacked the capacity for moral 
and reasoned judgment and that their behavior was impulsive and 
caused by environmental factors beyond their control.
9
  
 
 6. AM. BAR. ASS‘N, DIALOGUE ON YOUTH AND JUSTICE, PART I: THE HISTORY OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 5 (2007), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/publiced/features/DYJfull.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 7. See David S. Tanenhaus, Degrees of Discretion: The First Juvenile Court and the 
Problem of Difference in the Early Twentieth Century, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN 
105, 107 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberley Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005) (citing Julian W. 
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909)). 
 8. Id. (discussing Progressives‘ call to find out where children were in each of these 
categories). 
 9. Donna Bishop & Hillary Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent 
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Because they were perceived as more amenable to treatment and 
less culpable for their criminal behavior than adults, youth were 
diverted from the criminal justice system to newly established 
juvenile courts.
10
 These courts were created to ―rescue‖ wayward 
youth and transform them into responsible citizens.
11
 Benign judges 
talked to the children in informal, confidential proceedings, where 
they were shielded from the public ridicule of a criminal accusation 
or conviction, and decided how best to ―treat,‖ rather than punish, the 
child.
12
 Beginning in 1899 as an experiment in Illinois, juvenile 
courts spread across the country by 1925.
13
  
Notwithstanding these early goals and intuitions, the juvenile 
court has experienced a number of philosophical shifts since its 
inception. Judicial discretion has been tempered by due process; 
paternalism has given way to accountability; and rehabilitative 
responses to adolescent behavior have been eroded by increased 
media attention to public safety, victims‘ rights, and a demand for 
increasingly harsh punishments in juvenile court.
14
  
 
Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 
125, 127–29 (2007); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A 
Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 
143–44 (1997) [hereinafter Scott & Grisso, Evolution of Adolescence]; Elizabeth Scott, The 
Legal Construction of Childhood, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 113, 117 (Margaret K. 
Rosenheim, Franklin E. Zimring, David S. Tanenhaus & Bernadine Dohrn eds., 2002) (juvenile 
court founders believed that children lacked ―the capacity for reasoning, moral understanding, 
and judgment on which attributions of blameworthiness must rest‖).  
 10. Scott & Grisso, Evolution of Adolescence, supra note 9, at 141–44; Barry Feld, 
Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 J. L. 
FAM. STUD. 11, 16 (2007); Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 
STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 143, 146 (2003). 
 11. See Barry Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the 
Conservative “Backlash”, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1456–57 (2003); Elizabeth Scott & 
Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 804–05 (2003).  
 12. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967); Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality 
in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be 
Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 525–38 (2004) (reviewing history of confidentiality in 
juvenile courts); Scott & Grisso, Evolution of Adolescence, supra note 9, at 138. 
 13. HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (1927) (placing 
juvenile courts‘ spread across the country at around 1914); Michele Neitz, A Unique Bench, a 
Common Code: Evaluating Judicial Ethics in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 101 
(2011) (placing the spread of juvenile courts at 1925). 
 14. See Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: 
Retributive Versus Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1112–15 (2009) 
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By 1967, punitive practices came into direct conflict with the 
paternalistic philosophy of juvenile courts and were a direct target of 
the ―due process revolution‖ of the 1960s.15 Proponents of due 
process complained that the rhetoric of rehabilitation was a mask for 
unfettered discretion and punishment imposed without necessary 
procedural protections.
16
 The Supreme Court acknowledged these 
concerns in 1967, when it held in In re Gault that youth were getting 
the ―worst of both worlds,‖ as they had neither the rehabilitation that 
was promised nor the procedural rights that were afforded to adults.
17
 
Gault ultimately guaranteed accused youth the right to notice of 
charges, the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, 
and the right to cross examination and confrontation.
18
 
Although Gault did set the stage for procedural reform in the 
juvenile justice system, it did not dismantle juvenile courts and did 
not guarantee accused youth all constitutional protections afforded to 
adults.
19
 Further, notwithstanding evidence of evolving skepticism 
about the viability of rehabilitation and increasing support for youth 
accountability,
20
 judges and policymakers did not fully abandon 
rehabilitation in the ―due process era‖ and still viewed youth as less 
mature and less deserving of punishment than adults.
21
  
 
(detailing punitive policy wave of the 80s and 90s); Scott & Grisso, Evolution of Adolescence, 
supra note 9, at 138 (discussing shift from rehabilitative era to due process era to get tough era). 
 15. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 18 n.23 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 
(1966)) (articulating the concern that without due process or effective rehabilitation juveniles 
were getting the ―worst of both worlds‖); Bishop & Farber, supra note 9, at 132–36 (discussing 
the Due Process revolution); Feld, supra note 11, at 1461–83 (tracing racial and political history 
from the first juvenile courts to the due process revolution).  
 16. See generally Feld, supra note 11, at 1480–83. 
 17. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18 n.23 (citing Kent, 383 U.S. at 556). 
 18. Id. at 33, 41, 55. 
 19. See id. at 22, 25 (noting that due process does not prevent states from providing for 
the confidentiality of juvenile court); see also Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections 
on Judges, Juries and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 553, 558–62 (1998) (detailing the Court‘s decision in Gault to recognize some 
rights for juveniles but not others). 
 20. Arthur R. Blum, Comment, Disclosing the Identities of Juvenile Felons: Introducing 
Accountability to Juvenile Justice, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 349, 371–72 (1996); Scott & Grisso, 
Evolution of Adolescence, supra note 9, at 145–46. 
 21. Scott & Grisso, Evolution of Adolescence, supra note 9, at 145–46; Feld, supra note 
11, at 1486–87. 
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Rehabilitation faced the most significant challenge in the late 
1980s and 1990s, when public perceptions of high and rising crime 
rates led state legislatures to pass punitive laws to address juvenile 
delinquency.
22
 Throughout the country, legislators amended statutes 
to require that youth be tried in adult court at younger ages and for 
more offenses, be presumptively detained pending trial, serve 
mandatory minimum or blended sentences in both juvenile and adult 
facilities, and submit DNA samples or register in sex offender 
databases.
23
 Even more explicitly, legislators amended juvenile court 
purpose clauses to incorporate the goals of public safety, youth 
accountability, and victims‘ rights.24 More than ever, recent trends in 
juvenile court law and practice suggest that policymakers have lost 
sight of the founders‘ initial vision of immature and malleable youth 
and have given up the prospect of rehabilitating young offenders.
25
  
 
 22. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 806–10; see also David S. Tanenhaus & 
Steven A. Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused”: The Changing Legal 
Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 642 (discussing facts that 
cast doubt on the validity of those perceptions). See generally RICHARD A. MENDEL, 
AMERICAN YOUTH POLICY FORUM, LESS HYPE, MORE HELP: REDUCING JUVENILE CRIME, 
WHAT WORKS—AND WHAT DOESN‘T 29–37 (2000); HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA 
SICKMUND, NAT‘L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 
NATIONAL REPORT 127 (2006) (reporting that between 1994 and 2003, there were substantial 
declines in arrests for overall juvenile violent crime (-32%), murder (-68%), forcible rape 
(-25%), robbery (-43%), and aggravated assault (-26%) and noting that declines were 
proportionately greater for juveniles than for adults). 
 23. See Feld, supra note 11, at 1558–68 (discussing waiver laws and harsher sentences in 
juvenile courts after the 1980s); Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of 
Trends in Criminal DNA Databanking, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 209, 210, 219 (2000) (listing 
twenty-six states with laws including juveniles in DNA collection); Suzanne Meiners-Levy, 
Challenging the Prosecution of Young “Sex Offenders”: How Developmental Psychology and 
the Lessons of Roper Should Inform Daily Practice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 499, 504–05 (2006) 
(addressing the political climate as leading to harsh prosecution of juveniles for sexual offenses 
and the requirement to register); Perry L. Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement 
of Kids: An Equal Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 308 (2008) 
(observing that nearly half of the states used mandatory minimum sentencing in 1997). 
 24. Henning, supra note 14, at 1113–15 (surveying changes in juvenile court purpose 
clauses).  
 25. See Scott & Grisso, Evolution of Adolescence, supra note 9, at 137, 148–49; Scott & 
Steinberg, supra note 11, at 805–07; Mark W. Lipsey, Can Rehabilitative Programs Reduce the 
Recidivism of Juvenile Offenders? An Inquiry into the Effectiveness of Practical Programs, 6 
VA. J. SOC. POL‘Y & L. 611, 611–19 (1999) (responding to argument that rehabilitative 
programs do not reduce recidivism with meta-analysis of efficacy and effectiveness of 
rehabilitative programs). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012]  Balancing Due Process, Autonomy, and Paternalism 23 
 
 
The Supreme Court‘s recent review of adolescent development 
research in Graham v. Florida and Roper v. Simmons suggests that 
policymakers may be heading in the wrong direction with juvenile 
court policy. Unlike policymakers who are beholden to the political 
will of their constituents, the Supreme Court has been seemingly less 
reactionary and more attentive to science in its analysis of criminal 
justice issues involving children. In 2005 and 2010, the Court relied 
on evidence of key differences between juveniles and adults to 
conclude that both the death penalty and life without possibility of 
parole in non-homicide cases constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment for youth.
26
 The Court‘s apparent endorsement of the 
developmental research in these cases arguably legitimizes it as 
relevant to the development of policy and practice for responding to 
juvenile crime. 
While fears about public safety seem to undermine confidence in 
the viability of rehabilitation for juveniles and obscure the important 
differences between juveniles and adults, contemporary research in 
child and adolescent development paints a different picture—one that 
re-affirms the beliefs of the founders of juvenile court. Over the last 
thirty years, research has identified significant disparities between 
adolescent and adult capacity—cognitively, psychosocially and, more 
recently, neurologically.
27
 Cognitive capacity involves logical 
reasoning and the ability to identify and weigh competing alternatives 
of a given choice, while psychosocial development involves social, 
emotional, and temporal perceptions and judgments.
28
 Neurological 
development involves the maturation of the brain and brain 
functioning over time.
29
 As suspected by the Progressive reformers, 
 
 26. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 
2034 (2010). 
 27. See Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile 
Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 95–100 (2009) (surveying developmental psychology and 
neuroscience, but generally cautioning against the overreliance of developmental neuroscience 
in juvenile justice law and policy). 
 28. See Elizabeth Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from 
Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 291, 303–04 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) [hereinafter 
YOUTH ON TRIAL]. 
 29. See Elizabeth Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, 
and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 812 (2005). 
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research confirms that youth in early adolescence have difficulty 
conceptualizing future consequences and do not have the same 
cognitive ability to process information and engage in logical 
reasoning as adults.
30
 Although research has shown that these 
cognitive differences begin to even out by late adolescence and that 
by the age of fifteen or sixteen, youth have similar cognitive abilities 
as adults in controlled settings, youth‘s psychosocial deficiencies 
persist well into late adolescence and often into early adulthood.
31
 
These psychosocial deficiencies mean that youth tend to 
underestimate the risks involved in a given course of conduct, focus 
heavily on the present while failing to recognize and consider the 
future, and often have difficulty controlling their own conduct and 
regulating their moods and emotions.
32
 Further, as the Supreme Court 
recognized in Roper and Graham, youth ―are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to . . . outside pressures‖ than adults, especially peer 
pressure.
33
  
Fortunately, as youth grow and mature, their cognitive and 
psychosocial capacities improve.
34
 Over time, youth develop the 
skills they need to process information and think in hypotheticals.
35
 
As they move into early adulthood, they are also less likely to make 
impulsive, peer-driven decisions and begin to mature out of criminal 
behavior precisely because they acquire new values, learn to resist 
peer pressure, and are better able to understand and control their 
emotions.
36
 As both Roper and Graham recognize, juveniles are 
―more capable of change than are adults‖ and ―their actions are less 
likely to be evidence of ‗irretrievably deprived character‘ than are the 
actions of adults.‖37 This concept of youth has obvious implications 
 
 30. Elizabeth Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental 
Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 28, at 304–05. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. at 303–04; Scott & Grisso, supra note 29, at 815–16; Scott & Steinberg, supra 
note 11, at 811–12. 
 33. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
569 (2005). 
 34. See Scott & Grisso, Evolution of Adolescence, supra note 9, at 157–58.  
 35. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 812. 
 36. See id. at 816. 
 37. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (recognizing youth‘s 
malleable nature and the potential for maturation). 
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for every stage in the juvenile court process and may provide the 
impetus for juvenile court reform. The next two sections explore the 
possible scope and limits of that reform. 
II. GRAHAM V. FLORIDA: RE-AFFIRMING AN ADOLESCENT-
APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO JUVENILE BEHAVIOR 
The Court‘s rationale in Roper and Graham treats youth as a 
mitigating factor and supports a rehabilitative response to juvenile 
crime.
38
 In both cases, the Court refused to characterize youth as 
irredeemable and was unwilling to give up on their potential for 
―remorse, renewal and rehabilitation.‖39 Advocates and scholars 
committed to juvenile justice reform can, and have already, drawn 
upon the language of Graham and the developmental research it 
endorses to challenge coercive police tactics that take advantage of 
the youth‘s immaturity, advance affirmative defenses to a range of 
alleged offenses, and resist punitive juvenile court sentences, 
transfers to adult court, and collateral consequences of sex offender 
registries.
40
  
As Professors Steven Drizin and Richard Leo argue, immature 
judgment, poor risk perception, and susceptibility of youth to external 
pressures make youth particularly vulnerable to coercive police 
tactics such as intimidating interrogations and coercive searches at 
the time of arrest.
41
 Because juveniles are often eager to comply with 
adult authority figures and generally focus on more immediate goals 
 
 38. Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. 
L. REV. 99, 124 (2010) (asserting that Graham establishes a right to rehabilitation for juvenile 
offenders). 
 39. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (―[I]t would be 
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for greater possibility exists 
that a minor‘s character deficiencies will be reformed.‖). 
 40. See Arya, supra note 38, at 133–44 (arguing that the logic in Graham could be applied 
to challenge juvenile transfer laws); Nina W. Chernoff & Marsha L. Levick, Beyond the Death 
Penalty: Implications of Adolescent Development Research for the Prosecution, Defense and 
Sanctioning of Youthful Offenders, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL‘Y 209, 209–
18; Meiners-Levy, supra note 23, at 505–06 (suggesting that developmental research be used to 
challenge juvenile sex offender statutes); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 10, at 162–63 
(proposing an affirmative defense of ―developmental negligence‖). 
 41. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 944, 1004–05 (2004). 
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such as trying to end the police interview, they are often more 
susceptible to trickery, duress, and false promises than adults.
42
 
Youths‘ general lack of knowledge, experience, and capacity to 
identify and weigh risks further compounds their vulnerability in 
interactions with the police.
43
  
Such concerns were central to the Supreme Court‘s holding in In 
re Gault that fundamental fairness guarantees accused youth the right 
against self-incrimination. As the Court noted, ―admissions and 
confessions of juveniles require special caution.‖44 Reciting from its 
prior opinion in Haley v. Ohio, the Court recalled Justice Douglas‘ 
sentiment:  
[W]hen, as here, a mere child—an easy victim of the law—is 
before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. 
Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He 
cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. 
That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can 
overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the 
period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence 
produces. A 15-year-old lad, questioned through the dead of 
night by relays of police, is a ready victim of the inquisition.
45
 
 As recently as July 2011, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court 
cited to Graham in expanding its understanding of the vulnerability 
of youth in contact with the police and held that age must be 
considered in determining whether a suspect was in custody for 
purposes of the Miranda analysis.
46
 The Court relied on both 
adolescent development research, as well as common understandings 
about the differences between juveniles and adults.
47
 Specifically, the 
Court accepted the ―commonsense conclusion[]‖ that juveniles are 
―‗less mature and responsible than adults,‘‖ ―‗more . . . susceptible to 
. . . outside pressures,‘‖ and lacking in ―‗experience, perspective, and 
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. at 1005. 
 44. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967).  
 45. Id. at 45 (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 US 596, 599 (1948) (plurality opinion)). 
 46. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403, 2406 (2011). 
 47. Id. at 2403 n.5. 
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them.‘‖48 The Court also cited studies finding a considerable risk that 
many juveniles will confess to crimes they never committed in the 
physical and psychological isolation of custodial interrogation.
49
 
Unlike subjective factors that are inappropriate for consideration in a 
Miranda analysis, youth is typically readily apparent to the officer, 
and common experience makes clear that youth generally lack the 
capacity to avoid choices that could be detrimental.
50
 
Following the logic of Gault, Graham, and J.D.B., research 
documenting deficiencies in adolescents‘ decision-making and 
impulse control may be incorporated into other challenges to the 
admissibility of evidence obtained from youth. Developmental 
research has obvious implications for the youth‘s capacity to 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently consent to a search of 
personal property, participate in a lineup, or waive other procedural 
protections such as the right to counsel and the right to trial.
51
 
Because a minor‘s capacity to waive rights depends on his ability to 
engage in logical reasoning as well as psychosocial variables such as 
peer influence, pressure to please authority figures, impulsivity, and 
risk perception, all waivers by juveniles should be scrutinized 
closely.  
Key differences between juveniles and adults may also support 
various affirmative defenses at trial and allow defense counsel to 
challenge government evidence regarding the mens rea—or state of 
mind—necessary for criminal intent.52 Research suggests that youth 
may lack the capacity to engage in mature judgments that form 
specific and even general intent to commit a crime.
53
 For example, 
psychosocial features of childhood and adolescence that affect 
impulse control, prevent youth from regulating emotions, and 
 
 48. Id. at 2403 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 674 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 569 (2005); Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)). 
 49. Id. at 2401 (citing Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1570 (2009) (citing Drizin 
& Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 906–
07 (2004))). 
 50. See id. at 2403. 
 51. Chernoff & Levick, supra note 40, at 215. 
 52. See id. at 213–15; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 10, at 165–67. 
 53. See Chernoff & Levick, supra note 40, at 213–14; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 10, 
at 162–65. 
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heighten the youth‘s perception of threat, may bolster a claim of self-
defense in juvenile court.
54
 In an adolescent-appropriate response to 
juvenile behavior, the reasonable person standard should be modified 
to account for differences in the decision-making capacities of youth 
and adults.
55
 Some advocates have even argued for a return of the 
infancy defense that would prohibit the state from prosecuting youth 
under the age of seven and impose a burden on the prosecution to 
prove that youth in early adolescence have the ―capacity to 
understand the wrongfulness of their conduct‖ and control their 
behavior.
56
  
Theories of diminished culpability and rehabilitative potential 
advanced in Graham also call into question harsh, punitive 
dispositions such as lengthy periods of incarceration in state juvenile 
justice facilities, blended-sentences that require youth to spend time 
in juvenile and adult facilities, and waiver to adult court.
57
 Likewise, 
collateral consequences such as sex offender registration, DNA 
databanking, eviction from public housing, and exclusion from public 
schools only make sense if youth are sufficiently blameworthy to 
warrant such harsh, long term consequences or if such consequences 
would serve as a legitimate deterrent to future criminal behavior. 
Addressing both retribution and deterrence, the Supreme Court in 
Graham concluded that minors are categorically less deserving of 
retribution than adults because the same characteristics that make 
juveniles less culpable make them less susceptible to deterrence.
58
 
Because youth are often unable to control their impulses and unable 
to hypothesize about the future consequences of their actions, they 
 
 54. Jeffrey Fagan, Contexts of Choice by Adolescents in Criminal Events, in YOUTH ON 
TRIAL, supra note 28, at 389–91 (arguing that the claim of self-defense should be used more 
liberally as the ―context-defense‖ in juvenile cases, considering their social environment in 
determining culpability for violent encounters). See generally Taylor-Thompson, supra note 10, 
at 165–67 (discussing the employment of expert witnesses to testify about an adolescent‘s 
developmental status as an argument about the lack of ability to form intent). 
 55. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 10, at 171. 
 56. See Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy Is the 
Preadolescent’s Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 190 (2000) 
(suggesting revitalizing the infancy defense by switching to a presumption against the necessary 
mens rea for preadolescents). 
 57. See Chernoff & Levick, supra note 41, at 211–12; Arya, supra note 38, at 133–37. 
 58. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027–29 (2010); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 569–71 (2005). 
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are not likely to be deterred by harsh penalties.
59
 If deterrence does 
not work in the context of the harshest of penalties (the death penalty 
and life without parole), then it may be that deterrence does not 
justify other harsh, punitive sanctions. In addition, long term 
placements and lengthy periods of detention may not be warranted 
for retribution and incapacitation considering that most youth are 
amenable to rehabilitation or will likely grow out of crime after 
adolescence.
60
 In fact, studies have repeatedly shown that lengthy 
periods of institutionalization are more harmful than helpful, 
resulting in higher recidivism rates for institutionalized youth than for 
those supervised in the community.
61
  
As evident from the forgoing discussion, Graham has great 
promise for guiding society‘s response to juvenile crime in an 
adolescent appropriate frame; however, taken out of context, it 
carries considerable risks. The remainder of this Essay considers 
some of the tensions that Graham creates in the quest to balance due 
process, paternalism, and autonomy in children‘s law and policy. 
 
 59. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–29; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.  
 60. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 834–35 (suggesting that lengthy incarceration 
of youth like Lionel Tate may not be warranted if adolescent behavior is evidence of 
developmental immaturity that youth will likely outgrow rather than a manifestation of bad 
character); see also Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes 
on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 28, at 
28 (arguing that most youthful offending is a relatively normal adolescent phenomenon that 
youth will outgrow without major intervention and that formal social control may cause more 
harm than good); David A. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: 
How (not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1575 (2004) (arguing 
that youths‘ diminished moral competence means they should be punished proportionately less 
severely than adults and that punishment serves neither rehabilitative nor deterrent goals for 
youth who tend to outgrow their deviance). 
 61. See, e.g., BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF 
GROUP PLACEMENTS/SERVICES FOR YOUTH WITH BEHAVIORAL HEALTH PROBLEMS 1–2 
(2006), available at http://bazelon.org.gravitatehosting.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=NCd6-
AmZxdg%3d&tabid=166 (positing that segregating youth with behavioral issues is more 
harmful than helpful); MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS. CHILDREN‘S SERVS. TASK FORCE, 
PERSPECTIVES ON RESIDENTIAL AND COMMUNITY-BASED TREATMENT FOR YOUTH AND 
FAMILIES (Mar. 2010) (detailing research on effectiveness of out-of-home placements); 
ASHLEY NELLIS, RICHARD HOOKS WAYMAN & SARAH SCHIRMER, YOUTH REENTRY TASK 
FORCE OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION COALITION, NATIONAL 
ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS AND THE SENTENCING PROJECT, BACK ON TRACK: 
SUPPORTING YOUTH REENTRY FROM OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT TO THE COMMUNITY 17–23 
(Fall 2009) (outlining negative effects of out-of-home placement). 
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III. PROCEEDING WITH CAUTION AFTER GRAHAM: THE RISK OF 
TURNING BACK THE CLOCK ON DUE PROCESS  
Achieving a balance among due process, individual rights, and 
paternalism has been one of the greatest challenges in the 
development of a coherent policy and jurisprudence in the juvenile 
justice system—and in children‘s law more broadly. Paternalism and 
due process have long existed at a tenuous balance in juvenile courts. 
While the flexibility and informality of most juvenile courts have 
significant advantages for youth, history has shown that these 
features often come at the high cost of inaccurate fact-finding, 
punishment in the name of rehabilitation, and abuse of discretion that 
may be consciously or subconsciously motivated by class and racial 
biases throughout the system.
62
 At the risk of undermining a very 
important victory in the recognition of diminished culpability of 
youth, this Essay considers how an overbroad reading of Graham 
may support arguments for a more paternalistic juvenile court, derail 
the long-fought battle for due process for accused youth, and 
undermine adolescent autonomy.  
A. Unconstrained Paternalism Versus Due Process 
Early juvenile courts were very paternalistic, with the state 
serving as surrogate parents when court officials believed the natural 
parents had neglected or failed in their duties.
63
 Progressive reformers 
believed that children were essentially dependent on others for moral 
guidance, particularly their parents; thus, when parents failed, the 
state had no choice but to intervene.
64
 Some early reformers even 
proposed that society should respond to delinquent children in the 
 
 62. See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 19, at 571–82 (contrasting the informality and 
discretion of judicial fact-finding in juvenile courts with the group decision-making in jury 
trials that tends to reduce the risk of bias); Moriearty, supra note 23, at 307–08 (arguing that 
juvenile court's lack of fundamental procedural safeguards and emphasis on social factors 
require subjective value judgments and ―heighten the risk that impermissible factors, such as 
race, will influence outcomes‖). 
 63. See Tanenhaus, supra note 7, at 109 (citing Chicago‘s first Juvenile Court probation 
officer, TIMOTHY D. HURLEY, JUVENILE COURTS AND WHAT THEY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED, 
CHICAGO: VISITATION AND AID SOCIETY (1904)). 
 64. Id. 
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same way they respond to neglected children.
65
 Early application of 
this parens patriae doctrine meant that youth could be deprived of 
liberty with minimal or reduced procedural protections.
66
 Because the 
courts intended to serve the ―best interest‖ of the child rather than 
impose punishment, the formalities of counsel, cross-examination, 
jury determinations, public trials, and other features of due process 
were seen as unnecessary.
67
 Instead, juvenile courts were designed to 
allow judges the flexibility to ―fashion individualized treatments in 
order to rehabilitate offenders.‖68 
Over time, the Supreme Court recognized that the promise of 
rehabilitation could not be made at the sacrifice of all due process. In 
a series of cases spanning from Kent v. United States in 1966 to 
Schall v. Martin in 1984, due process and rehabilitative paternalism 
were at the core of the legal debate concerning American children.
69
 
While there is now little dispute that accused youth are at least 
nominally entitled to certain fundamental rights, such as the right to 
counsel and notice of charges in delinquency cases, the Court has 
repeatedly tried to strike a balance between the ―informality‖ and 
―flexibility‖ that traditionally characterize juvenile proceedings and 
the ―fundamental fairness‖ demanded by the Due Process Clause.70 
Thus, even in the heart of the ―Due Process Era,‖ which led to 
considerable procedural reform in the juvenile justice system, the 
Supreme Court often noted that many aspects of the juvenile court 
process are still valued and should remain unencumbered by 
 
 65. Id. at 107. 
 66. See Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful 
Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 28, at 82. 
 67. Id. at 82–83; Richard Kay & Daniel Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court 
Proceedings: A Non-Polar Approach, 61 GEO. L.J. 1401, 1403 (1973). 
 68. Tanenhaus, supra note 7, at 110. 
 69. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554–55 (1966) (discussing due process 
requirements for waiver hearing); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984) (holding that due 
process does not preclude preventive detention for juveniles); see also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 
519, 541 (1975) (holding that due process bars double jeopardy in juvenile cases); McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550–51 (1971) (finding that jury trials not required by due process 
in a juvenile proceeding); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is required by due process in juvenile cases). 
 70. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 263 (―‗The problem,‘ we have stressed, ‗is to ascertain the 
precise impact of the due process requirement upon [juvenile] proceedings.‘‖) (citing In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1967)); Breed, 421 U.S. at 531; McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543 (plurality 
opinion); Winship, 397 U.S. at 366. 
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constitutional restraints.
71
 In Gault for example, the Court explicitly 
reaffirmed the value of state experimentation with confidentiality in 
juvenile proceedings and has never since concluded that juveniles 
have the right to a public trial.
72
 Similarly, in 1971, the Court 
declined to hold that juveniles are entitled to a jury trial after 
concluding that juries were not necessary to ensure accurate fact-
finding and would ―effectively end the idealistic prospect of an 
intimate, informal protective proceeding.‖73  
As late as 1984, paternalism was used to justify preventive 
detention of juveniles, even for low-level crime that would not 
warrant such detention for adults.
74
 As the Court noted in Schall v. 
Martin, a ―juvenile‘s liberty interest may, in appropriate 
circumstances, be subordinated to the state‘s ‗parens patriae interest 
in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.‘‖75 In deciding 
whether preventive detention of juveniles before trial comported with 
principles of fundamental fairness, the Court drew heavily from its 
understanding of the diminished capacity of youth to regulate 
themselves and reasoned that 
children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to 
take care of themselves. . . . Society has a legitimate interest in 
protecting a juvenile from the consequences of his criminal 
activity—both from potential physical injury which may be 
suffered when a victim fights back or a policeman attempts to 
make an arrest and from the downward spiral of criminal 
activity into which peer pressure may lead the child.
76
  
In the lower court opinion cited in Schall, the New York Court of 
Appeals went even further by suggesting that because children lack 
 
 71. Gault, 387 U.S. at 22; Schall, 467 U.S. at 263 (―The Constitution does not mandate 
elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles.‖). 
 72. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 24; see also Henning, supra note 12, at 531–32.  
 73. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.  
 74. Gary L. Crippen, Can Courts Fairly Account for the Diminished Competence and 
Culpability of Juveniles?: A Judge’s Perspective, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 28, at 410 
(calling for the end of overuse of pretrial detention as a central step towards effective juvenile 
justice reform); Moriearty, supra note 23, at 303–06 (criticizing the extensive use of pretrial 
detention under paternalist rationales that actually do more harm than good). 
 75. Schall, 467 U.S. at 265 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)). 
 76. Id. at 265–66. 
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restraint and control, society should expect that children will commit 
crimes and must act to protect itself and the child from the likely 
repetition of crime. As that court noted:  
Our society recognizes that juveniles in general are in the 
earlier stages of their emotional growth, that their intellectual 
development is incomplete, that they have had only limited 
practical experience, and that their value systems have not yet 
been clearly identified or firmly adopted. . . . For the same 
reasons that our society does not hold juveniles to an adult 
standard of responsibility for their conduct, our society may 
also conclude that there is a greater likelihood that a juvenile 
charged with delinquency, if released, will commit another 
criminal act than that an adult charged with crime will do so. 
To the extent that self-restraint may be expected to constrain 
adults, it may not be expected to operate with equal force as to 
juveniles.
77
  
Given the Court‘s on-going commitment to rehabilitation and its 
unwillingness to fully regulate juvenile courts with due process, 
paternalism retains a strong presence in the contemporary juvenile 
justice system.  
Several assessments of juvenile courts across the country reveal 
some of the detrimental impacts of paternalism.
78
 Assessments are 
rife with evidence that judges and probation officers pressure 
children to waive their right to trial and counsel to expedite 
proceedings and access purportedly rehabilitative services.
79
 
Evidence also indicates that judges, prosecutors, and probation 
officers often expect the child‘s lawyer to act in the ―best interest‖ of 
the child and ignore legal errors and deficiencies in the prosecution‘s 
 
 77. People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 687–88 (1976).  
 78. For example, the American Bar Association and the National Juvenile Defender 
Center, in partnership with a number of other advocacy organizations, have conducted a series 
of state assessments on the access to and quality of legal representation for juveniles. All of 
those assessments are available at http://www.njdc.info/assessments.php. 
 79. Bishop & Farber, supra note 9, at 142–47 (discussing motivations behind the high rate 
of juvenile waivers of the right to counsel); Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: 
Client Counseling Theory and the Role of Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 245, 260–63 (2005) (compiling systemic evidence of paternalism). 
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case.
80
 In the face of systemic pressure, defense counsel routinely 
waive evidentiary challenges to government evidence, encourage 
children to plead guilty before investigating the charges, and defer to 
probation officers and parents as a primary source of information 
about the child‘s interests.81 Attorneys concerned about the welfare of 
the child may ignore ethical mandates regarding client loyalty and the 
attorney-client privilege to ensure the child gets services that the 
attorney thinks are needed.
82
 At the extreme, an attorney may ―refuse 
to fight‖ charges of alleged delinquent conduct even if he knows the 
child is innocent, or may request ―more restrictive or longer periods 
of confinement‖ if he believes such penalties will better rehabilitate 
the child.
83
  
Studies also document the dangers of unfettered discretion and 
paternalism facilitated by juvenile detention and disposition statutes 
that provide few or no criteria for judges and probation officers. In 
most juvenile courts, children can be sentenced to indeterminate 
commitments to a state facility until their twenty-first birthday for 
any delinquent offense.
84 
At disposition, decision-makers often rely 
on social factors, such as perceived family instability, that may lead 
to racially-coded disparities.
85
 The informality of juvenile courts and 
the broad discretion afforded to juvenile court judges creates an 
opportunity for conscious or unconscious bias and allows for lengthy 
removals of youth from the community.
86
 Discretion at every stage of 
 
 80. Henning, supra note 79, at 260–62.  
 81. See id. at 288–89 (discussing evidence and effects of paternalistic advocacy). 
 82. Ellen Marrus, Gault, 40 Years Later: Are We There Yet?, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. No. 3 
Art. 6 (2008) (discussing the ―child saver‖ lawyering-style of defense attorneys who saw the 
justice system as a way to teach the child a lesson); Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The 
Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court-A Promise Unfulfilled, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. No. 3 Art. 5 
(2008) (discussing the culture of the court and how the ―best interest‖ model persists despite it 
being harmful and unethical to young clients).  
 83. Henning, supra note 79, at 288–89. 
 84. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2322(a)(4) (2011).  
 85. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 404–05 (2007); 
see also Moriearty, supra note 23, at 287 (discussing reliance on ―social factors‖ such as family 
stability). 
 86. See, e.g., Sandra M. Ko, Why Do They Continue to Get the Worst of Both Worlds? The 
Case for Providing Louisiana’s Juveniles with the Right to a Jury in Delinquency 
Adjudications, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 161, 184–85 (2004) (identifying the trend 
of over-institutionalizing non-violent youth and the reality of judicial discretion leading to 
racial disproportion in Louisiana).  
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the juvenile justice process, including the disposition stage, has been 
identified as a significant contributor to the current disproportionate 
incarceration of youth of color in state institutions and residential 
facilities.
87
  
Youth processed through juvenile justice systems may be sent to 
facilities euphemistically labeled residential treatment centers (RTCs) 
designed to ―treat‖ youth with mental health or behavioral problems. 
The placement of youth in these facilities, whether they be referred to 
as ―treatment‖ or ―incarceration,‖ has not been supported by the 
research as an evidence-based best practice.
88
 There is little to no 
reliable research that illustrates that residential treatment centers 
actually work to improve behavioral problems.
89
 In fact, placing 
children with behavioral difficulties with other children with similar 
issues may only exacerbate behavioral concerns.
90
 Not only are these 
youth deprived of positive role models, but they may also adopt the 
negative behaviors of their peers.
91
 Furthermore, any gains that may 
be made in placement do not easily translate into the community 
upon release. Many children revert back to old patterns, and any 
skills acquired while in ―treatment‖ are lost in the difficult transition 
from institutionalization to the community.
92
  
Residential treatment programs can also be dangerous. Placement 
can expose youth to physical abuse and abusive behavioral control 
methods, such as seclusion and restraints.
93
 In 2007, the Government 
 
 87. See Johnson, supra note 85, (discussing the problem of discretion and the resultant 
racial bias, masked punitive agendas, and overuse of residential facilities); Moriearty, supra 
note 23, at 315 (quoting a judge admitting to placing more youth in residential facilities for 
factors that correlate with race).  
 88. Magellan Health Servs. Children‘s Servs. Task Force, supra note 61, at 4; UNIV. 
LEGAL SERVS., INC., OUT OF STATE, OUT OF MIND: THE HIDDEN LIVES OF DC YOUTH IN 
RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT CENTERS 10 (2009); U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 170 (1999), available at http://www. 
surgeongeneral.gov/library/mental health/toc.html#chapter3.  
 89. See MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS. CHILDREN‘S SERVS. TASK FORCE, supra note 61, at 
4. 
 90. See BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 61 (―The effects of 
labeling, being part of a cohort group with non-normative behavior, reinforcement of deviant 
behavior, and deviance training are all factors contributing to adverse outcomes.‖). 
 91. Id.; UNIV. LEGAL SERVS., supra note 88, at 7. 
 92. MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS. CHILDREN‘S SERVS. TASK FORCE, supra note 61, at 4.  
 93. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-146T, RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT 
PROGRAMS: CONCERNS REGARDING ABUSE AND DEATH IN CERTAIN PROGRAMS FOR 
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Accounting Office released a report surveying residential treatment 
programs throughout the country and uncovered rampant allegations 
of abuse as well as reports of deaths.
94
 Such abuse is obviously not 
rehabilitative but rather harmful to the child‘s psyche and ability to 
function upon release.  
Finally, youth placed in residential programs risk the collateral 
consequences of institutionalization upon release. Many schools will 
prevent youth who have been detained from re-enrolling due to fear 
of the youth‘s behavior or concerns about the school‘s overall 
academic performance.
95
 Even if the youth is allowed to return, 
credits earned in classes taken in placement often will not transfer to 
their home schools.
96
 Youth may also be automatically disqualified 
from Medicaid while incarcerated in juvenile facilities and required 
to re-enroll upon release, which can take up to three months.
97
 
Unfortunately, many youth are not able to move back home after 
placement because of conflicts with parents or exclusion from public 
housing after arrest.
98
 
While key differences between juveniles and adults acknowledged 
in Graham provide firm support for a paternalistic response to 
juvenile crime and delinquency, unconstrained paternalism may do 
more harm than good. It is essential that policymakers, judges, and 
other juvenile justice stakeholders keep paternalism in balance with 
due process and individual autonomy, as explored in the remainder of 
this Essay. 
B. Autonomy  
While evidence of deficiencies in adolescent decision-making has 
deeply influenced the Court‘s views on the diminished culpability of 
minors in criminal cases,
99
 similar evidence has long provided the 
 
TROUBLED YOUTH 3 (2007); UNIV. LEGAL SERVS., supra note 88, at 8–9. 
 94. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 93.  
 95. NELLIS ET AL., supra note 61, at 13–14. 
 96. Id. at 14. 
 97. Id. at 16. 
 98. Id. at 17–18. 
 99. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding life without parole for 
juveniles in a non-homicide conviction unconstitutional); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 
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rationale for legislative and judicial limits on the autonomy of youth. 
As the argument goes: if it is true that youth lack the capacity, 
control, and judgment necessary to warrant punitive responses to 
their criminal behavior, then it is also true that youth lack the 
capacity and judgment necessary to make decisions and exercise 
rights on their own behalf. As a result, youth need to be protected 
from the potential consequences of their own poor judgment and 
behavior and need adults to identify and protect their interests for 
them. Thus, theories of diminished capacity bring the need for 
paternalistic regulations in direct competition with children‘s 
autonomy and right to self-determination.
100
  
Outside of the juvenile justice system, presumptions about the 
diminished capacity of youth have been used to justify laws and 
regulations that curtail youth‘s recreational activities, restrict a young 
girl‘s unfettered access to an abortion, and limit a child‘s right to 
avoid unwanted medical treatment.
101
 Laws that impose compulsory 
school attendance and deny youth the right to drive, marry, and 
purchase alcohol or pornography all stem from a belief that minors 
lack the experience and judgment necessary to make good decisions 
for themselves. Judicial determinations that favor parents‘ rights over 
children‘s rights in medical decisions involving the child rely on 
similar judgments.
102
  
The tension between adolescent rights and capacity has been most 
obvious in the seminal debate about a young girl‘s right to an 
abortion without parental consent. In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme 
Court was forced to grapple with the tension between the 
fundamental right to liberty and integrity of one‘s body and the need 
 
(2005) (holding unconstitutional the imposition of the death sentence when offender was under 
eighteen at the time the crime was committed). 
 100. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 10, at 149–50 (discussing the competing agendas of 
pro-choice advocates and those pushing for juvenile justice reform); Cynthia Ward, Punishing 
Children in the Criminal Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 433–35 (2006) (pointing out the 
irony of the contradictory positions while arguing against diminished culpability of youth). 
 101. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647–48 (1979) (restricting a minor‘s access to 
abortion unless she has proven to a judge that she is mature enough to make the decision and it 
is in her best interest); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (granting parents the ability to 
commit children to state mental hospitals because children are not mature enough to make 
judgments about their own medical care and parents usually act in the best interest of the child).  
 102. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. But see Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647–48. 
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for parental or other adult guidance for young girls who 
presumptively lack the experience, judgment, and capacity to make 
such decisions for themselves.
103
 The Court struck a balance by 
denying parents absolute veto over the minor‘s decision to abort and 
endorsed a judicial bypass system that would require a minor to show 
maturity to make the decision on her own. Although it recognized 
that many sixteen and seventeen-year-olds are capable of giving 
informed consent for an abortion,
104
 the Court held fast to the view 
articulated in earlier cases that ―minors often lack the experience, 
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could 
be detrimental to them.‖105  
While advocates for young people in the criminal justice system 
lobbied for wider recognition of the diminished capacity and reduced 
culpability of youth, advocates for youth in the abortion debate 
necessarily argued that adolescents are sufficiently mature and 
competent to reason through options and to make important 
healthcare decisions without the involvement and consent of their 
parents.
106
 Children‘s advocates who supported a minor‘s right to 
abort recognized the potential consequences of a Supreme Court 
finding that minors are immature beings who lack the capacity for 
reasoned choice and refused to join the amicus brief in Roper, which 
argued that youth have diminished culpability when they engage in 
criminal conduct.
107
 Thus, although youth advocates in both of these 
contexts are likely to sympathize with each other‘s agenda in the 
abstract, the important implications of the developmental research 
has produced an interesting, maybe unanticipated, rift in the child 
advocacy community.
108
  
The American Psychological Association (APA) found itself at 
the center of this conflict. On more than one occasion, the APA has 
 
 103. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634–48. 
 104. Id. at 631. 
 105. Id. at 635; see also id. at 640. 
 106. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies: Forging a Common Understanding 
of Adolescent Competence in Healthcare Decision-Making and Criminal Responsibility, 6 NEV. 
L.J. 927, 928 (2006). 
 107. Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors’ Access 
to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 584 (2009). 
 108. Mutcherson, supra note 106. 
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weighed in on the legal debates involving criminal culpability and the 
minor‘s capacity and right to choose an abortion. In its amicus briefs 
in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health and Hodgson v. 
Minnesota, the APA argued against parental notification and consent 
based on research that most adolescents have the capacity to 
understand, reason, and solve problems in a way that makes them 
competent to make decisions about important moral and medical 
issues.
109
 Specifically, the APA asserted that by the age of fourteen, 
youth demonstrate ―adult-like intellectual and social capacities . . . 
necessary for understanding treatment alternatives, considering risks 
and benefits, and giving legally competent consent.‖110  
In contrast, in its 2004 amicus brief in Roper, the APA asserted 
that children are developmentally immature and less culpable than 
adults.
111
 Judges and policymakers found it difficult to understand 
how youth as a class could be competent in one area of the law, while 
incompetent in others.
112
 In his dissent in Roper, Justice Antonin 
Scalia took the APA to task for taking seemingly contradictory 
positions:
113
 ―[T]he American Psychological Association (APA), 
which claims in this case that scientific evidence shows persons 
under 18 lack the ability to take moral responsibility for their 
decisions, has previously taken precisely the opposite position before 
this very Court.‖114 
Within the juvenile justice context, children‘s lawyers have also 
taken seemingly conflicting positions regarding the capacity of youth. 
 
 109. Id. at 938 (quoting Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners/Cross-Respondents, Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 
U.S. 502 (1990) (Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309) [hereinafter APA Akron Brief]); Steinberg et al., 
supra note 107, 583–84 (discussing APA‘s brief in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 
(1990)); Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners/Cross-Respondents, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (Nos. 88-805, 88-
1125, 88-1301) [hereinafter APA Hodgson Brief]. 
 110. APA Akron Brief, supra note 109, at 20.  
 111. Brief for the American Psychological Association & the Missouri Psychological 
Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 5–8, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter APA Roper Brief].  
 112. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
seemingly divergent positions of APA); Steinberg et al., supra note 107, at 583–84 (discussing 
Court‘s attention to ―flip-flop issue‖ during Roper). 
 113. Roper, 543 U.S. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id.  
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While defenders frequently argue that children lack the decision-
making capacity to justify full criminal responsibility, they also argue 
that youth have the capacity to exercise important rights—such as the 
right to engage and direct counsel, or deny a police search—and to 
make critical decisions—such as how to plead and whether to 
testify.
115
 To some extent, the right to counsel and other procedural 
rights in the juvenile justice system only make sense if the child has 
the capacity to safeguard or exercise those rights. For example, the 
right to the assistance of counsel is most effective as a procedural 
protection when the child can provide counsel with information 
needed to confront the government‘s evidence, help counsel construct 
a defense, and guide counsel in key decisions regarding how to 
proceed at various stages of the juvenile case. When children are 
unable to engage and assist counsel, the right is undermined.
116
  
The Supreme Court‘s rationale for adopting a categorical rule 
against the sentence of life without the possibility of parole for 
juveniles in Graham v. Florida was based in part on concerns about 
the deficiencies in the attorney-child relationship.
117
 The Court 
specifically recognized that youths‘ ―limited understandings of the 
criminal justice system,‖ distrust of authority figures, ―[d]ifficulty in 
weighing long-term consequences,‖ and impulsiveness all threaten 
the attorney-client relationship and potentially affect the outcome of a 
case.
118
 Further, because psychosocial features of adolescence lead 
many youth to reason and act with a more immediate, rather than 
future orientation, youth often make decisions based on a temporary 
set of beliefs and values that are likely to change over time and fail to 
consider the long-term consequences involved in the many decisions 
required to be made in a delinquency case.
119
 To compensate for 
 
 115. Henning, supra note 79, at 317; Kristin Henning, When Parental Authority Goes Too 
Far: The Fourth Amendment Rights of Minors in Their Parents’ Homes, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
 116. But see Part IV, which recognizes the protective value of the right to counsel even if 
the child lacks the capacity to fully actualize the right.  
 117. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010).  
 118. Id.  
 119. See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 67, at 91 (noting adolescents‘ ―distorted time 
perspective and a tendency to discount long-term consequences (such as risk of long-term 
confinement) in favor of immediate consequences (such as looking ‗cool‘ in the eyes of 
peers)‖); Melinda G. Schmidt et al., Effectiveness of Participation as a Defendant: The 
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limitations in the youth‘s ability to effectively participate in and 
guide the attorney-client relationship, the Court determined that a 
categorical rule was necessary to protect against the risk of unfairness 
inherent in case-by-case determinations regarding juvenile 
culpability.
120
  
The Court‘s understanding of adolescence and concerns about the 
attorney-child relationship arguably lend support to arguments in 
favor of a more paternalistic role for juvenile defenders and greater 
state interventions in the lives of youth. However, a more nuanced 
understanding of the developmental research should help judges and 
policy makers understand that Graham‘s application of the research 
is limited by its context. Because youth rely on their decision-making 
capacity to different degrees in different settings, evidence suggests 
that paternalism may not be required to resolve every legal issue 
involving youth. In 2009, the APA responded directly to Justice 
Scalia‘s criticism and dissent in Roper v. Simmons when it 
distinguished between the cognitive capacity needed to make a 
decision in the controlled context of a medical decision and the 
psychosocial capacities needed to make and act upon good judgment 
in the context of typical juvenile criminal behavior.
121
 As discussed 
more thoroughly in Part IV, these distinctions provide an important 
insight in our effort to balance due process, autonomy, and 
paternalism in contemporary juvenile courts.  
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHTS-CULPABILITY TENSION 
Given that paternalism, due process, and autonomy remain at such 
a precarious balance in the juvenile justice system, the Supreme 
Court‘s relatively rare discussion of adolescence in Graham and 
Roper has the potential to significantly influence juvenile justice 
 
Attorney-Juvenile Client Relationship, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 175, 179–80 (2003); Elizabeth S. 
Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 591–92 (2000). 
 120. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
 121. Steinberg et al., supra note 107, at 585 (discussing APA‘s distinguishing of Roper 
from Hodgson); Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 13 n.23, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 
08-7621) [hereinafter APA Graham Brief]. For additional discussion of the importance of 
context in adolescent capacity, see infra notes 134–42 and accompanying text. 
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policy and practice beyond issues of culpability and mitigation. Part 
IV attempts to understand the limits of Graham in identifying an 
appropriate framework for children‘s rights that preserves due 
process and avoids overly paternalistic state interventions. Part A 
differentiates between ―protective‖ rights that are guaranteed to 
youth, regardless of capacity, as a protection against unwarranted 
state deprivations of liberty and ―autonomy‖ rights that are typically 
reserved for those who demonstrate the capacity to exercise and 
safeguard those rights. Part B draws from the APA‘s more recent 
literature to explore ways in which youth‘s capacities vary according 
to context. Both Parts A and B emphasize the right to loyal, client-
directed defense advocacy as an example of due process and 
autonomy that should be preserved notwithstanding deficiencies in 
adolescent decision-making and psychosocial capacities.  
A. Protective Rights  
Although it is sometimes overly simplistic to collapse children‘s 
rights into any two categories, for our purposes, we can characterize 
most children‘s rights as either ―protective‖ or ―autonomy‖ rights. 
Protective rights are those necessary to ensure the welfare and safety 
of the child and to prevent exploitation and abuse, including abuses in 
the juvenile and criminal justice system.
122
 Children are entitled to 
protective rights irrespective of their capacity to waive or assert those 
rights and generally depend on adults for their enforcement.
123
 
Capacity-based (or autonomy) rights are those that are generally 
reserved for youth or adults who have demonstrated the capacity to 
 
 122. See Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer the Children?: A Call for United 
States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 161, 165 (2006) (defining protective rights); see also John D. Goetz, Note, Children’s 
Rights Under the Burger Court: Concern for the Child but Deference to Authority, 60 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1214, 1224 (1985) (discussing due process and children‘s protective rights 
against the state in the civil context). 
 123. See Anne C. Dailey, Children's Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099, 2100, 
2129–30 (2011) (acknowledging fundamental rights of children and discussing recognition of 
procedural due process rights for children in Gault); cf. Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to 
Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 
DEPAUL L. REV. 983, 1003 (1993) (discussing parental role in development of child‘s 
freedom). 
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exercise or protect those rights.
124
 Parents, policymakers, and courts 
are more willing to respect the autonomy of youth as they 
demonstrate maturity, self-control, and capacity for reasoned 
judgment.  
Many procedural protections guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause are appropriately characterized as protective rights that do not 
depend on the minor‘s capacity for enforcement. For example, within 
the juvenile and criminal justice context, the accused is entitled to 
several protections designed to ensure accurate fact-finding and avoid 
unwarranted deprivations of the accused‘s liberty by the state.125 In 
deciding whether to extend various protections guaranteed to adults 
in criminal proceedings to juveniles in delinquency cases, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly analyzed the role of the proposed right 
in ensuring a fair and reliable fact-finding process.
126
  
For example, in Gault, the Court concluded that the privilege 
against self-incrimination was necessary to prevent the state from 
using force, undue stress, or psychological domination to elicit a false 
or unreliable confession from a child.
127
 The Court‘s concerns about 
the special vulnerabilities of youth made the privilege against self-
incrimination even more important for juveniles than adults.
128
 Other 
procedural protections extended to juveniles in Gault, such as the 
right to adequate notice of charges and the right to confrontation and 
cross examination, are also appropriately characterized as protective 
rights necessary to ensure accurate fact-finding.
129
  
Similarly, in In re Winship, the Court concluded that the right to 
have the government prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt was 
 
 124. See Dailey, supra note 123, at 2137–38 (distinguishing between children‘s rights 
based on capacity and children‘s rights based on vulnerability, including due process rights in 
the juvenile justice system); Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, 
Child and the State, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 37 (2004) (noting that capacity-based rights 
limit exercise of children‘s rights to those who self-initiate). 
 125. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 274–77 (1984) (discussing procedural protections 
necessary to ensure against ―erroneous and unnecessary [pretrial] deprivations of liberty‖). 
 126. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (concluding that jury 
trials not necessary for accurate fact-finding); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 373–74 (1970) 
(concluding that proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary in avoiding erroneous 
confinement). 
 127. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967).  
 128. See id. at 45–46. 
 129. Id. at 33–34, 56–57. 
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equally necessary in juvenile courts as in criminal courts to protect 
the innocent and avoid erroneous confinement.
130
 Even the Court‘s 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania decision not to extend certain rights—such 
as the right to a jury trial—to juveniles was based in part on the 
Court‘s conclusion that jury trials were not essential to ensure reliable 
fact-finding.
131
 The procedural protections discussed here emanate 
from a belief that all individuals have an inherent right to freedom 
and liberty from isolation and confinement by the state absent clear 
justification that intervention is warranted. These rights attach at birth 
and are not diminished by the limited capacities of youth.  
Like other due process protections, the right to counsel is an 
essential component of a fair trial.
132
 As the Supreme Court noted in 
the criminal context, an adversarial system with ―partisan advocacy 
[from] both sides,‖ including the defense, ―best promote[s] the 
ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go 
free.‖133 In Gault, the Court was swayed by the recommendation of 
the 1965 President‘s Crime Commission that defense counsel be 
appointed to ensure procedural justice ―as a matter of course 
wherever coercive action is a possibility, without requiring any 
affirmative choice by [the] child or parent.‖134 As the Court 
ultimately concluded, a ―juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to 
cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to 
insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he 
has a defense and to prepare and submit it.‖135 As such, the defense 
counsel plays a central role in facilitating fair, accurate, and reliable 
fact finding.  
While the right to counsel is certainly justified by a protective 
rationale, it may also be limited by capacity-based concerns. The 
unique function of the defense counsel as the voice of the accused 
necessarily invokes capacity-based concerns about the child‘s ability 
 
 130. Winship, 397 U.S. at 373–74. 
 131. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547.  
 132. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 322 (1981) (―There can be no fair trial unless 
the accused receives the services of an effective and independent advocate.‖). 
 133. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984) (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 
U.S. 853, 862 (1975)).  
 134. Gault, 387 U.S. at 38 (quoting Commission Report). 
 135. Id. at 36 (footnote omitted). 
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to use his voice and effectively direct counsel. As discussed in Part 
III, the effectiveness of the right to counsel as a protective right turns 
in part on the capacity of youth to engage counsel, understand 
options, and make decisions. The next section considers the role of 
context in determining youths‘ capacity to make decisions, and 
contrasts adolescent decision-making during the commission of a 
crime, as explored in Graham, with adolescent decision-making in 
the context of an effective attorney-client relationship.  
B. Capacity-Based Rights in Context 
In analyzing the potential scope of the Court‘s conclusions about 
adolescent immaturity in Graham, it is important to understand that 
adolescent capacity is not a binary construct.
136
 Context matters, and 
reasoned decision-making is a skill that varies according to 
experience, context, and instruction. In both Roper and Graham, the 
Court was asked to consider the relevance of adolescent immaturity 
and decision-making capacity in the context of adolescent criminal 
behavior, which involves a distinct set of psychosocial factors that 
differentiate it from other decision-making contexts.  
In defending its seemingly contradictory position in the abortion 
and criminal cases, the APA distinguished between a youth‘s 
cognitive abilities exercised in a controlled setting, and psychosocial 
capacities (such as impulse control, sensation seeking, future 
orientation, temporal perception, and the ability to resist peer 
influence that may hinder decision-making in fast-paced events).
137
 
Research has indicated that even where there are ―no appreciable 
differences between adolescents age 16 and older and adults‖ in 
―logical reasoning abilities in structured situations and basic 
information-processing skills,‖ psychosocial characteristics continue 
to develop ―well beyond middle adolescence and even into young 
adulthood.‖138 It is these psychosocial features that greatly affect the 
 
 136. See Mutcherson, supra note 106, at 929 (arguing that two positions on adolescent 
capacity are compatible). 
 137. See APA Graham Brief, supra note 121; Steinberg et al., supra note 107, at 585–86 
(discussing and supporting APA‘s distinguishing of cognitive abilities and psychosocial 
capacities). 
 138. Steinberg et al., supra note 107, at 586–87. 
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youth‘s behavior and capacity to make reasoned decisions for which 
they can be held completely accountable in the criminal context.
139
 
As the APA clarified in its brief in support of Terrance Graham:  
Hodgson addressed competence to make medical decisions, 
which can be made in a relatively unhurried manner in 
consultation with medical professionals, and thus focused on 
adolescents‘ cognitive abilities, noting that by mid-adolescence 
those abilities approximated those of adults. By contrast, the 
question in Simmons, as here, was the degree of adolescent 
culpability and (relatedly) adolescents‘ potential reformability 
when they commit criminal acts, acts that often result from 
impulsive and ill-considered choices driven by psychosocial 
immaturity.
140
 
Research further indicates that youths‘ cognitive capacity and 
decision-making skills are particularly unreliable in stressful 
settings.
141
 While adolescents‘ decisions about terminating a 
pregnancy can be made in a deliberative session in consultation with 
doctors, teachers, counselors, clergy, or mentors, decisions to commit 
crimes are usually spontaneous, unplanned, and typically committed 
with or in the presence of peers.
142
 Psychosocial deficiencies such as 
impulsiveness, pleasure-seeking, and peer pressure lead to risky 
behaviors such as crime and delinquency, unprotected sex, and 
reckless driving.
143
 Thus, the context in which the decision is made 
greatly affects the quality of the decision. Given the relevance of 
psychosocial variables in the different contexts, it is not inconsistent 
to argue both that youth are less culpable for acts they commit in 
 
 139. See id. at 587 (discussing continued development of psychosocial features).  
 140. APA Graham Brief, supra note 121.  
 141. See Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of Child 
Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 895, 900–19 (1999) (―Not surprisingly, research has shown that 
children perform best in contexts that are familiar to them and devoid of stress.‖); Schmidt et 
al., supra note 119, at 179 (―[T]heory and research suggest that compared with adults, 
adolescents‘ newly acquired cognitive capacities may be deployed with less dependability and 
less uniformity across settings, especially in stressful situations.‖); Jennifer L. Woolard & N. 
Dickon Reppucci, Researching Juveniles’ Capacities as Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, 
supra note 28, at 173, 178 (mentioning stress as influence on adolescents‘ performance). 
 142. See Steinberg et al., supra note 107, at 586.  
 143. Id. at 587.  
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stressful, peer-driven, and emotional scenarios, and yet capable of 
making informed decisions regarding, for example, their healthcare 
or legal choices.
144
 
Context has a significant impact on the child‘s ability to 
understand and assert legal rights in the juvenile justice system. As 
discussed in Part I, youth are particularly vulnerable to poor decision-
making in coercive, on-the-scene encounters with the police. Youth 
who are forced to make rapid decisions about whether to waive 
counsel, admit guilt, or consent to a police search without the 
opportunity to deliberate and consult with a loyal advisor, may make 
poor decisions that satisfy immediate rather than long term goals, and 
may not be able to identify and weigh all of the consequences 
associated with each of the available options. By contrast, lawyers 
and judges may provide a controlled, structured environment that is 
conducive to more deliberate decision-making. Thus, youth who have 
time to reflect, consider alternative strategies for release from police 
custody, and who consult with counsel about the likely consequences 
of a false confession are better positions to resist police pressure and 
make a well-informed decision about whether to talk to police.  
To combat the risk of coercion in juvenile interrogation, some 
states have adopted statutes requiring parental participation in police 
interviews with children.
145
 Although these statutes fall short because 
evidence suggests that parents are poor advisors in this context and 
lawyers generally have better knowledge and experience than parents 
to assist minors in these decisions, these statutes do properly 
recognize that adolescent capacity and decision-making may be 
improved in the right circumstances.  
C. Role of Counsel in a Post-Graham World  
The tension between paternalism, due process, and individual 
autonomy is probably nowhere more evident than it is in the debate 
about the proper role of juvenile defense counsel. While every state 
 
 144. See APA Graham Brief, supra note 121; Mutcherson, supra note 106, at 934; 
Steinberg et al., supra note 107, at 586. 
 145. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-317 (i)(2)(C) (West 2011); Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 19-2-511(West 2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. 38-2333(a) (West 2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7B-
2101(b) (West 2010).  
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guarantees the right to counsel for an accused juvenile after Gault, 
there is still considerable tension in juvenile court practice regarding 
whether the child‘s counsel should assume the role of a zealous, 
client-directed advocate or maintain a more paternalistic relationship 
with the child. Much has been written about the limited capacity of 
youth to engage lawyers.
146
 Historically, founders of juvenile court 
did not view the assistance of counsel as essential since juvenile 
courts were designed to rehabilitate and not punish the child.
147
 In the 
years immediately after Gault, scholars questioned whether the role 
of counsel should reflect the paternalistic philosophy of juvenile 
courts or mirror the role of counsel in adult criminal proceedings.
148
 
Some proponents of paternalistic advocacy argued that a best-interest 
paradigm was appropriate given the rehabilitative goals of the 
juvenile court,
149
 while others questioned whether youth had the 
capacity to direct their own counsel.
150
 Notwithstanding the firm 
support for loyal, zealous advocacy that was evident by the early 
1980s in legal scholarship and attorney practice standards produced 
by professional organizations such as the American Bar Association, 
the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the 
Institute for Judicial Administration,
151
 contemporary evidence 
suggests that paternalism persists in juvenile defense practice of 
juvenile courts across the country and that zealous, client-directed 
advocacy is lacking in many jurisdictions.
152
  
 
 146. See, e.g., Schmidt et al., supra note 119; Jennifer L. Woolard & N. Dickon Reppucci, 
Researching Juveniles’ Capacities as Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 28, at 173, 
177–78 (questioning whether juveniles can effectively participate in defense); Henning, supra 
note 79.  
 147. Kay & Segal, supra note 67.  
 148. See, e.g., Elyce Zenoff Ferster et al., The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the 
Role of Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (1971); Kay & Segal, supra note 67, at 1401. 
 149. See Jacob L. Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New 
Family Court, 12 BUFF. L. REV. 501, 507 (1962) (discussing vision of lawyer as ―officer of the 
court‖); Kay & Segal, supra note 67 (noting goal of focus on child welfare through non-
adversary model); Anthony Platt & Ruth Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: Occupational 
Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1156, 1179 (1968) (detailing lawyers‘ differing 
treatment of juvenile client in comparison with adult client).  
 150. Kay & Segal, supra note 67, at 1402, 1411.  
 151. Henning, supra note 79, at 255–57. 
 152. Id. at 257–59 (summarizing evidence of ―persistent culture of paternalism in the legal 
representation of children in the juvenile justice system‖). 
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While apprehensions about the quality of the attorney-child 
relationship, as described by the Supreme Court in Graham v. 
Florida, may fuel additional concerns about the proper role of 
counsel and support a more paternalistic paradigm for the legal 
representation of children, context clearly differentiates adolescent 
decisions that are made in the attorney-client relationship from those 
that are made in the context of a criminal offense. Deficiencies in the 
attorney-child relationship are as much a function of limited 
resources and inadequate lawyering as they are a reflection of the 
limitations in adolescent capacity.
153
 Even a child who makes poor 
judgments and rash decisions in on-the-street, peer-to-peer 
interactions may be able to render thoughtful, well-reasoned, case-
related decisions after counseling by his defender.
154
 Given adequate 
time and resources, juvenile defense counsel should structure the 
counseling process in a way that accommodates and enhances the 
child‘s cognitive, emotional, and psychosocial ability and fosters 
good decision-making for the child. Ideally, the attorney should 
provide clients with information about the available options, engage 
the child in a one-on-one, age-appropriate dialogue, and help the 
client assess the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative. 
Research suggests that the psychosocial aspects of decision-making, 
such as risk perception and risk-preference, are likely to improve as 
the attorney-client relationship improves.
155
 A child who has the 
assistance of a lawyer who patiently helps him identify all of the 
long-term implications of any decision will be in a better position to 
avoid hasty, short-sighted decisions.  
Although Graham expressed concerns about adolescent capacity 
to develop an effective attorney-client relationship, it did not suggest 
that juveniles are not entitled to zealous, loyal, client-directed 
 
 153. See Ko, supra note 86, at 181–82 (identifying the barrier to a fair trial posed by 
inadequate counsel for juvenile defendants); Jennifer M. Segadelli, Minding the Gap: Extending 
Adult Jury Trial Rights to Adolescents While Maintaining a Childhood Commitment to 
Rehabilitation, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 683, 703–04 (2010) (asserting that juvenile court is 
rapidly being equated with inadequate counsel). 
 154. See Steinberg et al., supra note 107, at 592; Henning, supra note 79, at 317–19 
(outlining ways in which attorney can optimize decision-making capabilities of youth through 
relationship-building and conducive environment).  
 155. Henning, supra note 79, at 318. 
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counsel. In fact, to the contrary, the Court implicitly recognized that 
the youth‘s counsel serves an important protective function by 
ensuring that the government proves its allegations beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that the minor‘s defense theory and mitigating 
evidence is identified and effectively conveyed to the judge and 
jury.
156
 It was the Court‘s concern that inadequate counsel could 
affect the outcome of a case that led it to adopt a categorical rule 
against the sentence of life without parole juveniles.
157
  
CONCLUSION 
Graham is one of three recent Supreme Court cases that advance a 
view of adolescents as immature, impulsive, and malleable. The 
Court relied heavily on this view to conclude that a sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole was cruel and unusual punishment 
for juveniles in non-homicide cases. While this categorical rule is a 
significant victory for children and provides considerable support for 
a more adolescent-appropriate response to juvenile offending, 
juvenile justice reformers must be careful not to over-read the Court‘s 
analysis and commitment to the rehabilitation of youth as a return to 
a pre-Gault paternalism that ignores due process and does little to 
protect youth from abuses and unwarranted interventions by the state.  
Understood in context, Graham‘s recognition of the diminished 
capacity of youth to make good decisions and control impulses is 
confined to the fast-paced, peer-driven, and stressful context of 
criminal activity. As the APA has discussed, adolescent capacity is 
not a rigid, binary construct. Context matters. While youth frequently 
demonstrate poor decision-making skills during the commission of 
crime, they may be able to engage in appropriate reasoning and 
analysis in a deliberative and controlled session with lawyers, 
doctors, or other advisors that is void of peer pressure and other 
negative influences. Thus, policymakers should not presume all youth 
to be incapable of making decisions in all contexts. Where adolescent 
capacity can be enhanced—such as in the attorney-client relationship 
or in important medical decisions—autonomy may be warranted. 
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Moreover, while some rights are reserved for adults who have 
demonstrated a capacity to exercise them, other rights are guaranteed 
to all, including youths, regardless of capacity to ensure the safety 
and welfare of the individual. Due process remains an essential 
feature in the justice system precisely because it protects against 
abuses, unnecessary interventions, and undue deprivations of liberty 
by the state. Thus, notwithstanding deficiencies in adolescent 
cognitive and psychosocial capacities, youth are entitled to important 
protective rights, such as the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the right against self-incrimination, the right to 
counsel, and the right to confront the government‘s evidence in the 
juvenile and criminal justice systems.  
In adopting a categorical rule against life without the possibility of 
parole for juveniles in non-homicide cases, the Court recognized the 
important function of defense counsel in ensuring fair, accurate, and 
reliable outcomes in criminal cases, and sought to guard against 
errors caused by limitations in the youth‘s ability to effectively guide 
and participate in the attorney-client relationship. As such, Graham is 
as much a reinforcement of the need for loyal, defense advocacy as 
an indispensable protective right as it is a recognition of the pervasive 
deficiencies in the attorney-child relationship. Ultimately, the fairly 
paternalistic outcome in Graham does not undermine adolescent 
autonomy in every context, nor does it diminish the Court‘s 
commitment to due process in the justice system. 
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